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Book Reviews
MANuAL oF FDmx)u Pn.crc. By Richard A. Lavine and George
D. Homing, Jr. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967. Pp. 730. $24.50.
An old lawyer I once knew thought he would write a book on
practice. "On second thought," he said, "I don't think I should tell
all of this until after I die." Maybe that is why that, except for treatises
on trial tactics, there tend to be so few good books on practice, and, so
many that are content merely to restate statutes, rules, and decided
cases. Practical lawyers, it seems, either do not have the time or do not
like to give up hardearned answers to their brethren on the pages of
practice manuals. But for a change, here is a manual that is plentifully
salted throughout with practical suggestions on how to get things done
in federal courts.' At the same time, there is a sufficient amount
of accurate, traditional scholarship on the current state of the law to
make this something more than the collected secrets of some trial at-
torneys.2 This nice mixture is certainly a reflection of the combined
1 R. LAviNE & G. HORNING, JEL, MAmJAL or FEDERAL PRunrIca (1967)
[hereinafter cited as LAvINE & HomRING]. The "how to do it" emphasis is re-
flected in frequent forms, checklists, appraisals of alternate courses, comments on
typical judicial reaction to various moves, and comments on strategy. Some of the
best contributions along these lines are contained in: a diversity jurisdiction
check list, Id. at 1 1.22; the materials on remedies against the government, Id. at
125-26, 130, 171; evaluation of choice of venue, Id. at 182; removal and remand
procedure, Id. at §§ 1.160-73; procedure on motions for transfer of venue, Id. at
§ 2.52; practice on making motions in general, Id. at §§ 1.109-12; discussion of
pre-trial conference Id. at §§ 6.1-.18; and appraisal of differences in state-
federal jury trials, Id. at § 7.1.
Of special value is a lengthy treatment of discovery, again with many
practical suggestions, e.g. on the race of diligence, Id. at 424; calling a witness to
avoid use of his deposition, Id. at 427; making objections even though they are
not waived, Id. at 429; the use of state procedure as an alternate to Rule 27, Id.
at 432; alternative mechanics in taking depositions, Id. at 436; the value of
prompt notice in shutting off objections, Id. at 442; the proclivities of judges,
Id. at 486; local rules on interrogatories, Id. at 483; reservation clauses in
answers, Id. at 484; and the 1967 changes in the law of government privilege,
Id. at 503.
Time-saver suggestions appear thoughout the text, e.g., "The clerk of that
court usually insists that the caption be replaced by a state court caption ...
This can be stapled over .. . Id. at 165; ". . . [E]xperienced trial counsel are
reluctant to make a motion to dismiss in a non-jury case at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's evidence." Id. at 560; it is good to provide extra copie: of the sum-
mons for the government, Id. at 306; the attorney before issuing execution must
determine at his peril whether requirements for entry of judgment have been
satisfied, Id. at 602.
2 The initial chapter synthesizing federal practice is an excellent short course
on the subject, but occasionally, because of the pressure of compression, there are
(Continued on next page)
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practical experience and scholarship of the two authors
3 and the list
of people to whom they are indebted.
4
The book contains only 675 pages of combined text and forms, and
it arrives on the market in the face of some thirteen volumes of
Moore's Federal Practice, twelve volumes of Barron & HoltzofFs
Federal Practice and Procedure and seven volumes of Nichol's
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
minor deviations which amount to under or overstatements. Examples of slight
flaws are:
(1) It is asserted that the plaintiff may have a choice of state or federal court
where the general set of facts involve: "In general, any type of case where plaintiff,
by choosing the remedy he seeks and the theory ofhis complaint, can shift a
federal law issue from the answer to the complaint or vice versa. See § 1.63." Id. at
34. But §§ 1.62-63 do not very adequately explain federal question jurisdiction,
(as if it is really very explainable) or bear out the implication that this is an
easy device.
(2) It is asserted that in many states it is standard practice for plaintiff to include
a number of 'Doe" defendants in the complaint, Id. at 61. But how standard
is this practice outside California? See D. LotusmL & G. HAZARD, CASES ON
PLEAmiNG A Paocmann 46C (1962).
(3) In discussing the problem of valuing the amount in controversy, LAvImE
HoRNNG at § 1.75, the book glosses over Judge Dobie's plaitiff-viewpoint rule
as advocated in 1 J. Mooun's FEmRAL PaAcTrcE § 0.91 (1960) and adopts the
alternative-result rule advocated by C. WmGHnT, HANnBox oN FEDERAL Cou Ts
§ 84 at 100 (1963), without citing any of these.
(4) In commenting extensively on the pendent jurisdiction doctrine of Hum v.
Oursler, LAvnE & HoRNmG at § 1.110, the book only casually notes, "see also
United Mineworkers v. Gibbs (1966) 383 U.S. 715." Yet this latter case at least
deserves a line for its expansion of the trial judge's discretion in deciding such
issues.
(5) In the commentary on service of process under Rule 4(f) within a 1OO
mile radius of the court, Id. at § 8.93, no mention is made of the limitation
relating the rule to the bringing in of additional parties.
(6) The treatment of the real party in interest under Rule 17, refers to the
"exceptions" listed in the Rule, Id. at § 3.106, whereas the Advisory Committee
Note to the 1966 amendment of Rule 17 says "The minor change in the text of
the rule is designed to make it clear that the specific instances enumerated are not
exceptions to, but illstrations of, the rule. Also, in § 8.109, the text scrambles
together two separate problem ; one i the problem of approprate parties in a
subrogation or assignment situation where diversity jurisdicton is not at issue.
The second is the same situation where jurisdicon n is also at issue and the
present 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1948), as successor of the assignee clause, now pro-
ibts "improper or collusive creation of jurisdiction.
(7) In discussing the motion for more definite statement, Id. at § 4.18, no
mention is made of the possibility that it may be frowned upon, e.g.,_Mitcellv. E-Z Way Towers, Inc., 269 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1959); n r, in advocating
p leading denials as the safest course of action, LI-vrn & HoRNNG at § 3.243,
does the book mention the obligations of Riule 11.
aRichard A. Lavine is the former Chief, Civil Division of the United StatesAttorney's Office in Los Angeles. George D. Horning, Ir. is a fmner As sist
United States Attorney for te District of Columbia andl now Professor of Lawat the American University.4 Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard of the Uniersaty of hieagoLaw Stchol
and the American Bar Foundation; Professor John Kaplan ou tano era 
a
School; Judge Richard F. C. Hayden. Jordan A. Dreifus. Tobias G. Klin0ger,Pa
Fitting, aMax F. Deutz, John P. Pollack, and Warren M. Christopher, all of 
Los
Angeles.
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Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, not to mention a sizeable list of
other federal practice aids. What then, has the Lavine and Homing
book to offer in the face of the other Goliaths? For one thing, quick,
direct, and concrete answers. The other federal practice works,
Moore's for example, have become so large and scholarly in depth, that
a quick answer is rarely possible. One may wallow for an hour in the
wrong section only to discover there is another, more extensive treat-
ment elsewhere. However, this manual is not in derogation of the
master works. Throughout, it cites to all the leading works, and many
others as well, for more extensive treatment of the complex and
debated issues. One of its best functions may be to serve as a compre-
hensive index to the Federal Rules, the Judicial Code and many of the
current federal practice works.
Its brevity is not the key asset, however, for certainly there are
other works of brevity. There is for example, Charles A. Wright's
Handbook on Federal Courts.5 Although Professor Wright originally
designed his book for students, it has already been used extensively
by federal judges for its clarity in restating the law and its cogency in
suggesting progressive resolutions to federal practice problems. Other
short works are Moore's Rules Pamphlet and Commentary on the U.S.
Judicial Code, published in current editions. The major difference is
that the organizing principle of these works has been the Federal
Rules and the Judicial Code, whereas the organizing principle of
Lavine and Horning's book is the chronological sequence of trial pre-
paration with the Rules, the Code, and forms meshed in where most
appropriate. Unlike the others, it is geared for functional use by the
lawyer rather than for the explanation of doctrine. This manuals only
major weakness appears to be that it will not be supplemented and
thus will tend to become gradually obsolete.0
Conceding that this book presents a concise, functional tour through
federal practice, what are some of the messages it carries? The authors,
familiar with federal problems, would have us believe that lawyers,
accustomed to the state court house, should not be reluctant to cross
over the street to the federal court. This, they say, is so because
federal practice is simple now that we have the liberal notice-pleading
of the Federal Rules-so long as the lawyer is very careful with
jurisdictional problems at the outset. However, almost every paragraph
in this manual belies the promised simplicity by ultimately referring
5 Weckstein, Book Review, 17 J. LEcAL ED. 349 (1965).0 See, e.g., proposals for change in discovery practice, note 8, infra, and in
jurisdiction of federal courts, note 11 infra.
19681
KEmnucxy LAw JouNAL[
to some complex problems that are resolvable only by further lengthy
research. True, the Federal Rules of 1938 may have accomplished a
great revolution in simplification, but what they give, Erie v. Tompkins7
sometimes taketh away. Similarly, the great liberality of the multi-
party, multi-claim Rules is often hamstrung by endless nice questions
of jurisdiction, because here, as in other areas, jurisdictional fetishism
persists.8 Again, the laudable innovations of federal discovery practice
are now encrusted with thirty years of precedent, and in bad need of
overhaul.9 While the admiralty rules have now been successfully
merged, and unified appellate rules have recently arrived, nationwide
service of process has not yet been accepted. A really rational system
of venue has not fully evolved, nor have the vast complexities of
government litigation been fully purged.10 Apart from these questions
there are serious problems of court congestion and judicial administra-
tion. Sometimes it may be too easy to rest on the laurels of the 1938
revolution" and to overlook fundamental inquiry into the system's
responsiveness to the needs of 1968's people.
The American Law Institute is laboring with high scholarly purpose
and constitutional theory to bring a new dawn to the federal courts,
especially on jurisdictional questions.12 Meanwhile the Judicial Con-
ference and the various Advisory Committees on the Rules of Civil
Procedure continue their efforts. Is Perhaps the most hopeful light on
the scene is the creation of the new Federal Judicial Center 4 and the
appointment of former Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark as its head.
With some productive effort from the new Center, this excellent
7304 U.S. 64 (1938).
S The authors apparently criticize the case of DiFrischia v. New York
C. By., 279 F.2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1960) (rejecting attack on jurisdiction after it had
been stipulated), LAvnE & HoRmNG at 16.
9 See CozsmarEr ON RU.Es OF PAcicE AND PRO Rnu Or = Jupicra.
CoNFER CE Or Tm Um~rxm STATES, P mmmNRY Darr OF PROPOSE AmND-
NTs TO RUL.ES OF CIqL PROCEDURE OR THE UrN STATES DisnucT COURTS
BELATNG TO DEPosmoN AN DiscovEny (Nov. 1967).
10 As one minor example, see situation where suits to review compensation
awards must be brought within 30 days in the right district, LA mE & HoRNinrG
at § 2.46.
11 State practice does not always lag behind the FEaE. RULEs. Illinois, for
example, has already adopted discovery practice which may be more liberal in
scope than even the proposed new federal rules. Compare note 8, supra, with
Ill. Sun. Ct. Rule 201(b) (1967) and Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 IMI. 2d 351, 221
N.E.2d 410 (1966). As another example, New York has abolished its counterpart
of Federal Rule 17, the real party in interest rule, as being needless and con-
fusing. See N.Y. Cwv. PRAc. AcT § 1004 (1963).
12 ALI, STUDY OF THE DVIsION OF JumrcrrON BETwzEN STATE AND
FEDERAL COURTS (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1967 and Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1965).
18 See, e.g., note 8, supra.
14 See N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1967, § C, at 42, col. 1.
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Manual, when in its second edition, may be able to thin down, or at
least present more rationally, problems of federal practice.
John E. Kennedy
Associate Professor of Law
University of Kentucky
GovERNN T SUBURBs. By Charles E. Gilbert. Bloomington, Ind.:
Indiana University Press, 1967. Pp. 364. $10.00.
The heavy concentration of today's urban population in outdated
jurisdictional units often results in an inefficient allocation of authority
and responsibility. Often a governmental unit is too small to effectively
confront the problems it faces or too large to mobilize sufficient human
and financial resources to eliminate them. Some suggest that since the
basic problem stems from the incapacity of the individual to relate to
the sprawling, amorphous environment in which he lives, existing
conurbations must be physically broken up and relocated across the
country. The urban existenialist asserts, "The city is to be ruralized
and the country is to be industrialized but the industrialization of the
country is aimed at preserving the balance between town and country
and escaping forever the giant conurbations of our time."' More
realistic urbanists reject this bucolic ideal and accept existing land use
patterns but urge that political institutions be radically restructured
to efficiently apply existing human and economic resources to the
solution of our seemingly endless urban problems.
Any book which purports to make a contribution to the growing
flood of urban literature must provide data and insights to help create
optimum levels of power consistent with democratic values. Professor
Gilbert's book, Governing the Suburbs, began "in conversations with
PENJERDEL (the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Deleware Project, Inc.)
in 1962 about a study of suburban governments which would comple-
ment work then in progress with the Fels Institute of Local and State
Government and the Pennsylvania Economy League."2 The conversa-
tions were successful and resulted in a 376 page study of government
structure, government performance, and political competition in three
suburban counties near Philadelphia. As the author notes in his in-
I Winthrop, Modern Proposals for the Physical Decentralization of Com-
munity, 43 LAND EcoNozMcs 17 (1967).
2C. GMBERT, GOVERNING =rm SUBUBS xiii (1967) [Hereinafter cited asT-
GuxERT].
